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Models for quality improvement and
assurance in English and Welsh primary care
Stephen Abbott Public Health and Primary Care Unit, St Bartholomew School of Nursing and Midwifery, City
University Institute of Health Sciences, London, UK, Susan Procter St Bartholomew School of Nursing and
Midwifery, London, UK and Nicci Iacovou Centre for General Practice and Primary Care at Queen Mary,
London, UK
Background: Various initiatives have been tried to improve the quality of primary care
in England andWales in the last fifteen years. Such initiatives can be divided into quality
improvement (QI) and quality assurance (QA). Purpose: This paper looks at three
contrasting models, drawn from data from 48 semistructured interviews with personnel
from three primary care organisations (PCOs): two primary care trusts in England and
one Local Health Board in Wales. Findings: The first model was collegiate, a voluntary
doctor-led initiative begun during the period of GP fundholding. The second is clinical
governance, a current government-imposed system administered by PCO officers,
which has attracted limited engagement from GPs. The third is the Quality and Out-
comes Framework of the new GP contract, which was generally described positively,
although the process of administering it was experienced as bureaucratic. Discussion:
The three models correspond with three organisational types: networks (which use peer
relationships to achieve goals), hierarchy (which use ‘top-down’ requirements and
monitoring) and market (which use contracts). Although doctors have traditionally
preferred network-style arrangements, the success of these arrangements in sustained
QA and QI has been questionable. The importance of hierarchical arrangements is
inevitable, given the functions and constitution of PCOs, and the risk that GPs will
disengage is similarly inevitable. However, it is important that PCO officers find ways to
engage GPs as much as possible in quality initiatives if patient services are to improve.
Key words: clinical governance; quality and outcomes framework; quality assurance;
quality improvement
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Introduction
It has often been observed that when national
governments reduce their central role and devolve
public service provision to intermediary organisa-
tions, centrally determined monitoring and reg-
ulation increase (Rhodes, 2000; Light, 2001). An
illustration of this is the English National Health
Service (NHS), which has seen both a reduction in
the number of hierarchical levels and an increase
in the number of regulatory and monitoring
mechanisms (Walshe, 2002). Many of the latter
mechanisms are external to health care organisa-
tions, but others, such as clinical governance, are
carried out internally. In the case of primary care
organisations (PCOs) in England and Wales,
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clinical governance should be understood as both
internal and external: internal to PCOs themselves
and external to the small businesses that are
operated by independent contractors within PCOs.
PCOs (primary care trusts (PCTs) in England
and Local Health Boards (LHBs) in Wales) are
statutory public sector organisations responsible
for purchasing or providing almost all health care
for their populations. Within them, independent
contractors (general practitioners (GPs), dentists,
optometrists and pharmacists) provide most pri-
mary health care. They are both part of and dis-
tinct from the PCO. Independent contractors do
not wish to be managed, hence their choice of
independence. Yet PCOs are expected to guide
and direct the development and quality of pri-
mary care, though they lack the management
tools to do so directly. They rely instead on the
terms of the contracts, which they administer on
behalf of the government, and persuasion.
Independent contractors thus have an ambiva-
lent status, a fact that causes some tension. The
introduction of clinical governance, for example,
represents either ‘interference’ in or ‘improve-
ment’ of primary care, depending on one’s point
of view. It attracted considerable academic
attention (Campbell et al., 2002; Sheaff et al.,
2003a; Degeling et al., 2004; Flynn, 2004), not
least because GPs did not necessarily see clinical
governance as supportive or constructive (Gray,
2004). There had long been a wariness among
some GPs of mechanisms such as audit that
sought to turn medical practice from an
individualised, subtle art into an unthinking,
routine activity based largely on guidelines
and rules
(Black and Thompson, 1993, p 851).
Nevertheless, even sceptical GPs had little
choice but to accept the principle of clinical
governance, partly because it was seen as inevi-
table and non-negotiable, and partly because
improving the quality of care is too self-evidently
a ‘good thing’ for it to be possible to argue against
it in principle. Other GPs had long been com-
mitted to improving the quality of care by audit,
the development of group practices and multi-
disciplinary teams, and the provision of profes-
sional training and education, and they viewed
the policy direction much more positively.
In common with other quality initiatives, clin-
ical governance concerns both quality improve-
ment (QI) and quality assurance (QA) (Campbell
et al. (2002)): QI mechanisms support clinicians
and their teams in improving their own practice,
while QA mechanisms detect and tackle poor
performance. There may be tensions between
these different functions (Campbell et al., 2002),
and Roland and Smith (2003) noted that PCOs
appeared to find QI easier than QA.
In 2004, a new GP contract introduced a further
quality mechanism in the form of the quality and
outcomes framework (QOF). This rewards GPs
for meeting a large number of very specific targets
relating to service quality. Structurally, the QOF
is very different from clinical governance, as it is
embodied in the GP contract, to which all GPs
must attend in order to receive income, rather
than in the processes of the PCO, with which GPs
may choose not to engage (Wilkin et al., 2002;
Degeling et al., 2004).
This paper draws on a study of the governance
mechanisms relating to quality in primary care in
England and Wales since 1991. It describes three
different models of how PCOs have tackled QI
and QA and discusses these in relation to the
well-known organisational typology of hierarchy/
market/network. The paper does not include the
other categories of independent contractor (den-
tists, optometrists and pharmacists) as no indivi-
duals from these groups were interviewed. Nor
does it consider practice-based commissioning,
an innovation in England that may be seen as a
market-style quality mechanism, although the
primary focus is on services other than those
already provided in primary care. This was not
fully established at the time of data-gathering,
and was therefore excluded, as data would be
provisional and speculative.
Methods
The study draws on three qualitative case studies
of PCOs, which looked at a wide range of aspects
of governance and quality: for example, the role
of boards and professional executive committees,
the commissioning process, and patient and public
involvement. Other findings will be reported
elsewhere.
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The case studies were based on semistructured
interviews with key personnel (officers, clinicians,
board members) in two PCTs and one LHB. PCT1
serves a London borough with a total population
of about 300 000 including considerable socio-
economic and ethnic diversity. PCT2 serves two out
of the three towns in a borough on the edge of a
metropolitan area in northern England, with a
population of about 78 000, deprived and almost
exclusively white British. LHB1 serves a prosper-
ous rural and country town population of about
93 000 (largely white British) in Wales. The strategy
for choosing case study sites was to represent a
diversity of organisational size, location and demo-
graphic characteristics. Recruiting sites proved
difficult, so the sample is less varied than intended,
and over-represents small PCOs.
Informants were selected as follows. Chief
executives were approached in the first instance;
they were asked to agree to be interviewed
themselves, and to nominate colleagues. Attempts
were made to interview at each site officers,
directors, board members and independent prac-
titioners and their staff.
Interviews took place in summer/autumn 2005
(LHB1 and PCT2) and late winter/spring 2006
(PCT2). They included a variety of questions
about the structure and functions of primary care,
both currently and since 1991 (see Box 1). It was
the intention that informants would be given the
freedom to expand on those parts of this exten-
sive topic guide that most interested them. Table 1
lists that proportion of interviewees (23/48) who
discussed at any length the issues that are the
subject of this paper. This paper draws on the
data gained from their interviews.
Interviews were taped and transcribed, and
analysed thematically using NVivo. Transcripts
were repeatedly read, using the constant com-
parison method, and themes were identified and
modified during the process. Conscious efforts
were made to identify differences between Eng-
lish and Welsh organisations and between larger
and smaller organisations, though these were
surprisingly few. Indeed, the final framework of
analytic categories reflected those in the original
research design, which used the hierarchy/market/
network framework with the addition of ‘gov-
ernance from below’ (patient and public invol-
vement; see Box 2).
Ethical approval was obtained from South East
Wales Local Research Ethics Committee Panel B
(05/WSE02/31).
Findings
Analysis of the data suggested three models for
promoting quality, and these are reported separately,
in chronological order. However, the three models
are in no sense mutually exclusive: for example,
clinical governance and QOF coexist in all PCOs.
Model 1
The first model was collegiate, and is well illu-
strated by the description of a total purchasing pilot
Box 1 Topic guide for interviews
What is your job title and role?
How long have you had this sort of role?
Thinking of each of the areas of commissioning in turn: what are the strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and strengths of the PCT/LHB’s governance for quality? Who/what do you see as
the key players/drivers?
To what extent are your commissioning objectives determined by national targets?
How does the PCT/LHB prioritise which national targets it will strive hardest to meet?
Have Patient and Public Involvement Forums and Overview and Scrutiny Committees/Community
Health Councils influenced PCT/LHB decision-making about primary care, and if so, how?
Do you try to build expertise and capacity in these organisations, and if so, how?
Does your organisation have adequate capacity to commission hospital services, community health
care and primary care? If not, which are the winners, which are the losers?
(Where appropriate): Please could you comment on how governance for quality in overseeing
primary care has changed throughout the many changes in policy since the early 1990s?
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recalled by LHB1 informants. Total purchasing was
a variant of GP fundholding. GP fundholding
allowed participating volunteer GPs to purchase a
restricted range of healthcare for their patients:
total purchasing allowed participating GPs to pur-
chase, theoretically, the whole range of health care
(although in reality this was not attempted (Mays
et al., 2001)). In the case of LHB1, the pilot
involved all the GPs in the county.
The main thing I think it achieved was
bringing the practices together in [county]y I
think what we achieved from it was probably
getting some clinical networking going. And
we did have some actual outcomes in terms of
particularly diabetes at that time, outcomes in
terms of running a [county] – wide audity
We picked up quite marked discrepancies in
the clinical care across the patch, and I think
it was peer group pressure was moving
towards changing those. Obviously some
people didn’t want to change but as a general
rule people were interested to see how other
practices were performing and what they
were doing and what sort of cases they were
referring, and there was a debate and discus-
sion as to the way forward. And I think that
did lead to an improvement of actual clinical
carey
(LHB1, GP3)
Table 1 Interviewees at the three sites who discussed quality issuesa
PCT1 PCT2 LHB1
Jan–May 2006 Aug–Dec 2005 July–Dec 2005
Interviews Chair Chief executive Chair
with major focus Chief executive PEC chair Chief executive
on quality PEC chair 4 officers 3 officers
4 officers 2 PEC members 1 GP
1 PEC GP GP
Sub-total 8 9 6
Other interviews Non-executive board member Chair Non-executive board member
3 officers 3 officers 7 officers
2 PEC members Chair of patient and public
involvement forum
4 GPs
Practice manager
Practice nurse
Sub-total 7 5 13
Total interviewed: 15 14 19
aClinical governance, QOF, other quality initiatives past and present.
Box 2 Analytic framework
Hierarchy
Pressure from government
Targets
Boards – membership
Boards – trust or challenge
Directly managed services
Markets
Contracts/service level agreements – effectiveness
Contracts/service level agreements – monitoring
Power balances
Hospital reconfigurations
Primary care contracts
GPs – Quality and outcomes framework
enhanced services
Dentists
Pharmacists
Networks – external
PCOs
Local government
NHS trusts
Networks – internal
Bureaucrats and clinicians
PEC
Clinical governance
Patient and public involvement
Structures and processes
Consultations
Effectiveness
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This was clearly a mechanism for QI rather
than for QA. It involved a ‘bottom-up’ colla-
boration that was voluntary and spontaneously
developed by GPs. The use of audit and peer
comparison as QI techniques were adopted by
many fundholding practices (Audit Commission,
1996) and other total purchasing pilots (Goodwin
et al., 2001).
The speaker noted that the collegiate model
had been maintained in a modified form with the
compulsory metamorphosis of the total purchas-
ing pilot into a Local Health Group in 1999. She/
he saw this as similar to the total purchasing pilot
in that it was primarily a clinical organisation,
which had been able to concentrate on the quality
of primary care. (It had had little influence on
hospital services, having chosen not to put its
efforts into an area where it had little power.
Local Health Groups advised health authorities
on the purchasing of hospital services, but could
not themselves directly purchase.) With the
compulsory transformation of the Local Health
Group into LHB, she/he felt that this clinical
focus had been lost: the statutory duties of the
LHB dominated the agenda, and the organisation
became bureaucratic rather than clinical. This
disengaged GPs who had formerly taken a lead-
ing role: they cooperated with the LHB without
being proactive.
Model 1 had also been evident in one part of
PCT1 during the 1990s, when a local Medical
Audit Advisory Group had flourished, bringing
together a number of diverse practices. This was
not described in detail, although the GP who
mentioned it said that some of the collegiate
relationships then forged were still alive and
active in the present, despite the demise of the
group itself.
Model 2
The second model was clinical governance, a
quality mechanism imposed by central govern-
ment, which required PCOs to put in place sys-
tems for monitoring clinical activity and processes
to help prevent poor practice. Tensions between
the support and surveillance functions of clinical
governance were evident. LHB1 officers empha-
sised that in maintaining clinical governance
systems (as indeed in administering the QOF),
they wanted to emphasise QI, but that not all GPs
were persuaded.
I went to see a GP yesterday and he said, ‘I
understand that you want to work with us,
but don’t forget that you police us as well!’
Yes, well, I know that, but we don’t really –
you know, we don’t carry the banner for
that, because I don’t like to be seen as the
police. But obviously they have this view of
usy
(LHB1, officer 2)
A colleague acknowledged that the supportive
approach was not just a matter of philosophy, but
was also more likely to yield results, in the form of
GP cooperation. Speaking of the introduction of a
clinical risk reporting system, she/he said:
It’s a no blame culture here. And it has to be
no blame, becausey if we put blame in, we
wouldn’t get the forms. And I would rather
that someone report to me and it was totally
anonymised, so that I could tell everybody
else it was happening and to be aware of it,
than not be told at all.
(LHB1, officer 1)
Rather than try to manage the tension between
QI and QA, PCT1 had sought to defuse it by
separating the different functions organisation-
ally. The GP lead on clinical governance had
emphasised from the start that clinical govern-
ance should
be seen as supportive, that we improve
quality through a supportive arrangement.
(PCT1, director)
As a result, clinical governance facilitators
were not expected to tackle issues of poor per-
formance. This arrangement may reflect the fact
that PCT1 had a higher number of GPs who gave
some cause for concern than did the other sites.
There was therefore a greater danger in PCT1
that QA processes might eclipse QI, and the
separation of QA and QI was able to stop this
from happening. Thus, good practitioners could
engage in clinical governance without feeling
unnecessarily ‘policed’, and less-good practi-
tioners need not feel alienated from clinical gov-
ernance personnel if there was any ‘top-down’
pressure on them to improve their performance.
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Informants at PCT2 described how clinical
governance in general had become more
bureaucratised. For one GP, it was the growing
dominance of the bureaucratic QA process that
had disengaged him, by not matching his own
interest in QI:
My reason for wanting to be involved was in
clinical governance was because of educa-
tion, was to help GPs to get better and to
help nurses to get better, and what have you.
But the educational component was quickly
squashed out, by the checking and mon-
itoring and appraisals and – all of which
have value, but whereas education can be
interesting and lively, that tended to be – the
dull bits became the important bits.
(PCT2, GP1)
A director acknowledged this shift from QI to
QA, seeing it as the result of external require-
ments.
We were at the point where actually we
were getting people to really sign up to it,
when we then got bombarded with this kind
of view of classic external mechanism, that
you know, tries to measure, and it’s mea-
suring the processesy My big issue is the
compliance issue with external mechanisms.
I have no problem at all in being accoun-
table, being assessed, and we do need to
have the right governance arrangements in.
But I do feel that over the last couple of
years that it has got to overkill. And from
my point of view, in a job that has a very
broad portfolio, I spend a lot of my time
doing things that to satisfy compliance,
where I could actually be spending my time
more effectively deciding and taking the
staff through the change management pro-
cess, making it better for patients.
(PCT2, director 2)
The imposition of external mechanisms meant
that clinical governance was seen by clinicians:
as though it was something that was done to
people, rather than it being a state of mind
that people need to start to live and breathe
and understand around quality
(PCT2, director 2)
And indeed, informants in all three sites sug-
gested that while the spirit of clinical governance
ought to be about living and breathing quality, the
reality was that the structures and processes that
had to be constructed and maintained looked
more mechanical than ‘alive’. Those directly
involved in clinical governance talked primarily
about the processes that had to be created, rather
than outcomes: the government’s requirements
for clinical governance arrangements appeared to
have made this focus inevitable, at this stage.
These data appear to confirm Degeling et al.’s
(2004) assertion that:
form has dominated substance in clinical
governance implementation (p 167).
This may change as arrangements for clinical
governance are completed and consolidated.
It should also be pointed out that there were
non-contentious aspects of clinical governance that
had been successfully embedded in all three
organisations: in particular, the local provision of
continuing professional education for GPs and
their staff. Since such provision was common
before the introduction of clinical governance, this
was not resented as an hierarchical imposition.
Model 3
The third model was the QOF, that part of
the new GP contract that focused on quality.
Opinions varied as to whether the QOF was in
harmony or contrast with clinical governance.
In PCT1, they were regarded as different: the
administration of the QOF was kept separate
from clinical governance processes. By contrast,
a director of PCT2 saw the administration of the
QOF as an extension of the work of clinical
governance:
We always had mechanisms for constructive
debates and dialogue with GPs under the
clinical governance format before the QOF.
And practice visits, on the basis of talking to
practices about how they managed their
practice and how they delivered care and
what their plans and proposals were for the
future, has always been a feature of life in
this part of the world anyway. And I see
the QOF as a sort of a refinement in a
development of those. With the addition,
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of course, of pretty significant financial
incentives.
(PCT2, director 1)
An important difference was that while GPs
could refrain from actively engaging in clinical
governance, and some did, that was unlikely to be
the case with the QOF, not least because there
were financial incentives for them to engage.
Technically, the QOF was voluntary; but as
declining to be judged by it meant a loss of
income, there were no reports of non-participa-
tion in any of the three sites.
PCO officers saw the potential of the QOF to
improve care, though they felt that establishing
the requisite processes had not yet yielded the
quality dividend they expected in the future.
Administering the QOF had helped PCO officers
to focus on primary care quality in detail:
it has really enabled us to get out there in
primary care and look more at the quality of
the services that are being provided against
various different indicators.
(PCT2, director 3)
However, increased understanding had not
necessarily yet resulted in improved outcomes:
Last year, I would say, the QOF didn’t
improve patient care. What it did was it
highlighted where patient care needed to be
improved, and where it was excellent or
good.
(LHB1, officer 1)
The speaker anticipated that improvement
would begin to be made subsequently. This view
was shared by an officer from PCT1:
What we were able to do this year with QOF
is highlight the focus on those practices that
hadn’t achieved as much, to work with them
as to why, reasons for that. And we’re
looking now to use the QOF data in a more
constructive way towards long term condi-
tions planningy QOF has also been quite
useful in terms of raising the profile of
patient experience because there’s quite a
lot of points for that.
(PCT1, officer)
A process outcome already apparent was that
general practices had put in place staff employ-
ment policies, but there was no evidence as yet
that these had become operational:
Last year they wrote the policies, and now
we want to make sure that they are using
them, and that they are working, and if we
need to adapt them.
(LHB1, officer 1)
From the point of view of GPs, there were
mixed opinions on whether the QOF had made or
not made a difference to service quality. One
thought that the QOF’s main function was to
reward the quality of GPs’ existing practice,
rather than to improve care:
By and large, general practices will prove
that they can provide quality services, and I
think that general practices is a quality ser-
vice anyway, and the QOF proves that.
(PCT2, GP2)
Others, while disliking the process, acknowl-
edged that it had made a difference:
I thought that ticking the boxes was awful.
But I have to say that I think our quality of
care, which we thought was quite good, has
improved. GPs traditionally – if someone
didn’t come for a follow up, you would shrug
your shoulders and you know, you would
just let them drift offy We weren’t very
good, because doctors by their nature aren’t,
at routine annual blood tests and things like
that. And I have to say, to my amazement,
writing and phoning patients: ‘You haven’t
come for the appointment, you haven’t
come to your annual follow up’, has actually
proved very effective.
(LHB1, GP1)
A board member at PCT2 described the impact
of the QOF on the achievement of three-star
rating for the PCO as a whole:
I think [the QOF] enabled us to get three
stars. I do, honestly, I think it’s made the
difference. Mostly the smoking cessation
y’cos we were struggling with that, you
know, we just couldn’t get it. And, I think in
some ways the fact that the points system
and points meaning pounds, I think that’s
quite a useful way of doing things. You
know if you can – if you can offer to pay
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somebody to do something and they do it
when you pay them, that’s a fairly direct
relationship. It’s a lot easier than trying to
win hearts and minds. I’m not saying that’s
the best way of doing things, but I would say
that with the QOFs – I think it has, it’s
helped us and we’ve done well with them. So
you know, I’m happy with it.
(PCT2, board member)
Such positive accounts of the QOF’s contribu-
tion were the exception rather than the rule.
Nevertheless, the tone of discussions about
the QOF was noticeably more positive than those
about clinical governance. The indicators were
acceptable as relevant to primary care, and
the linking of achievement with financial reward
was in harmony with the nature of reimbursement
already familiar to GPs.
Discussion
A number of limitations have already been allu-
ded to. In terms of size, the three PCOs were not
representative, since two were unusually small. In
any case, it would not be possible for just three
sites to be adequately representative of over 300
PCOs in their many aspects. Because of the wide-
raging nature of the topic guide, informants were
encouraged to choose the topics on which they
spoke at length, and a likely consequence of this
is that it was those people who found quality
issues problematic who chose to discuss them.
Thus, their views may not be representative: for
example, the fact that five general practice per-
sonnel in LHB1 did not speak at length on such
issues (see Table 1) suggests a degree of accep-
tance of the new arrangements not otherwise
articulated in this paper.
The three models outlined above may be
understood as instance of three different organi-
sational forms: network, hierarchy and market,
respectively (Thompson et al., 1991). The col-
legiate model of the Total Purchasing pilot
(LHB1) can be seen as a network: a voluntary
collaboration between small organisations that
worked together to achieve common goals while
preserving structural independence. Clinical
governance is an instance of hierarchy: imposed
from above by central government, and requiring
bureaucratic administration and the setting of
organisation-wide standards, and ultimately the
responsibility of the PCO board. The QOF ele-
ment of the new GP contract used a market
mechanism to reward the achievement of quality
indicators.
These classifications do not fit perfectly: NHS
organisational forms never mirror pure models
(Exworthy et al., 1999). For example, from the
general practice point of view, the collection of
QOF data, administered by PCO officers, looked
rather similar to the administration of clinical
governance, and therefore felt very bureaucratic.
Nevertheless, the QOF is a market mechanism by
virtue of being part of a contract that involves
financial incentives and allows service suppliers
(GPs) the freedom to opt in or out of that part of
the contract.
Another example of an imperfect fit is PCT1’s
arrangements for clinical governance which, it
could be argued, subvert the typology by using a
network (collegiate) approach to keep QI sepa-
rate from market (QOF) and hierarchy (QA). At
one level, this is something of a fudge, a denial
that clinical governance is part of what is clearly
a government QA agenda. But a degree of eva-
siveness was accepted by many of those inter-
viewed as necessary: a facilitative rather than a
directive style (Marshall et al., 2003) was widely
thought in all three sites to be more successful in
securing GP engagement, or at least avoiding GP
alienation. Because PCOs do not have a full
range of direct management techniques to use to
shape GP behaviour, they have therefore to use
‘soft leadership’ (Sheaff et al., 2003a). The tacit
agreement between officers and most GPs to
avoid alluding to the former’s surveillance func-
tions represents a ‘silent bargain’ or ‘implicit
negotiation’ (Strauss, 1978), which facilitates
action by avoiding conflict. This negotiation is
consistent with the view that senior managers:
are now seen more as agents of government
than as facilitators of professionally driven
agendas.
(Davies and Harrison, 2003, p 647)
It also supports Sheaff et al.’s (2003b) conclu-
sion that:
priority should be given to maintaining
professional values in a bureaucracy. (p 109)
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‘Soft-pedalling’ the bureaucratic style can be
seen as a useful way in which officers can reduce
the perceived threat to professional values.
Inevitably, discussions of contemporary hier-
archy involve discussions of bureaucracy because
hierarchical organisations are invariably bureau-
cratic. But bureaucracy is itself a word with a
variety of meanings. Lam (2000) (and see Flynn,
2004) provides a useful typology of organisational
structure, which sheds light on the nature of
bureaucracy in PCOs.
Lam classifies organisations by how knowledge
is organised: on the one hand, whether knowledge
is explicit and standardised, or tacit and personal;
on the other, whether it is held at the organisa-
tional level or at the level of individual profes-
sionals (see Table 2).
In the case of knowledge (and activity) relating
to quality, GPs have traditionally taken the view
that they embody such knowledge, tacitly, and so
without the need for organised structures or
processes. Black and Thompson (1993) found that
doctors resisting the requirement to introduce
medical audit systems claimed that they did it
anyway. Thus, prior to the introduction of
compulsory audit, GPs appear to have defined
themselves as the equivalent of an ‘operating
adhocracy’. Black and Thompson (1994)
observed, however, that in fact this existing
activity was spasmodic and disorganised. GPs
engaging in a more systematic approach to
knowledge and audit, such as occurred in fund-
holding consortia and total purchasing pilots, may
be regarded as working to a model of ‘profes-
sional bureaucracy’: it was collective reflection
and discussion, rather than organisational sys-
tems, that was the crucial process whereby quality
issues were addressed, and this was therefore a
network model of QI.
There can be little doubt that PCOs, by con-
trast, are hierarchical, and an example of
‘machine bureaucracy’, standardising knowledge
and work at organisational level. Knowledge does
not reside primarily in individual professionals,
but is collated and scrutinised across the organi-
sation by officers as well as professionals, using
standardised systems. Given the duties and
structures of PCOs, it is hard to see an alternative
to machine bureaucracy. In view of the officer-
dominated structure of PCO management, which
in its turn is an inevitable result of the statutory
functions of PCOs, neither adhocracy nor pro-
fessional bureaucracy can be sufficient as quality
mechanisms, partly because they address QI
rather than QA, partly because they are insuffi-
ciently systematic.
The codification of governance is at odds with
the idea that general practice is simply ‘ineffable’
(Exworthy et al., 2003), an idea that is very much
in keeping with the adhocracy model (‘you can
trust us to do the right thing even if we cannot or
do not explain ourselves’). The idea of ineffable
practice is also clearly incompatible with a culture
of evidence-based medicine.
Adhocracy and professional bureaucracy are
part of what Moran describes as:
the club-like structure of so much self-reg-
ulation in the professions
(Moran, 2004, p 32)
But, as he goes on to point out, such club-like
structures were:
the institutional epitome of [a] wider system
of club governmenty The destruction of
club government in medicine displaced,
precisely, a pattern of government through
informal networks with fuzzy boundaries
and replaced it with something more hier-
archical, codified and state-controlled.
(pp 35–6)
Thus, at the level of national policy and NHS
structure, networks have yielded to hierarchy.
Table 2 Lam’s organizational typology
Knowledge agent – autonomy and control
Individual Organization
Standardization of knowledge and work
High Professional bureaucracy Machine bureaucracy
Low Operating adhocracy J-form organization [matrix]
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But it is not clear that hierarchy, in the form of
machine bureaucracy, will engage GPs sufficiently
to enable it to do QI and QA better. Bad practice
may be more likely to be noticed and addressed,
but the disengagement of good clinicians may
result, and our study found evidence of this. In
other words, QA may displace QI. The impor-
tance of this is likely to be variable. In PCOs
where poor practice is a significant problem,
prioritising QA may be the best way of improving
the standard of care, at any rate in the medium
term. But it is unlikely to improve quality in
PCOs where the standard of general practice is
high.
Certainly, the evidence from this study suggests
that a professional bureaucracy is the model with
the most potential to harness ‘bottom-up’
aspirations to QI. This model had flourished, and
was mourned, in LHB1, while PCT1 had tried to
preserve it by maintaining organisational bound-
aries between QI, QA and the QOF. Whether the
network model is sustainable as an anomalous
enclave within a hierarchically dominated envir-
onment remains to be seen, as do the long-term
impacts of replacing professional with machine
bureaucracy.
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